Breaking the
code 
When the Wehrmacht introduced
the plugboard on the military Enigma, this added
an astronomical number of possible key stettings.
The general idea was that this military Enigma,
unlike the commercial types, would be impossible
to break. No one even tried to break it. However,
in 1932, Poland's Biuro Szyfrow (Cipher Bureau)
initiated attempts to analyse and break the
Enigma messages. Although the chief of this
Bureau received copies of codebooks sold by the
German spy Hans-Thilo Schmidt, he did not give
them to his codebreakers. He thought that keeping
this information from them might stimulate their
efforts.
Marian Rejewski, Henryk
Zygalski and Jerzy Rozicki were convinced that
mathematics could solve the problem and succeeded
in breaking the Enigma messages. They also
developed an electro-mechanical machine, called
the Bomba, to speed up the codebreaking process.
Two major security flaws in the German Enigma
procedures were the global groundsetting and the
twice encodes message-key, a procedure to exclude
errors. These flaws opened the door to
cryptanalysis. In 1939 the Bureau was no longer
able to break the codes due to increased
sophistication in the design, new procedures and
lack of funds for the code breakers. When Germany
invaded Poland, the Polish Biuro Szyfrow passed
its secret knowledge and several replica Enigma
machines to the baffled French and British
intelligence. The work of the Biuro Szyfrow was
vital, not only because their pioneering work
itself, but also because it convinced other
cipher bureaus that it was possible to break
Enigma.
Bletchley Park 
The Government Code and Cipher
School (GC&CS) at Bletchley Park initially
broke Enigma by hand. In August 1940 they started
using their own Bombes, designed by Alan Turing
and Gordon Welchman. It was also a rotary
electro-mechanical device but it worked on an
entirely different principle as Jerewski's Bomba.
The Turing Bombe searched for the enigma settings
for a given piece of plain and cipher text. When
an Enigma message was intercepted, codebreakers
had to search for so-called cribs. These cribs
were presumed pieces of plain text within the
encrypted message. This could be "An Der
Oberbefehlshaber", "An Gruppe",
"Es Lebe Den Fuhrer" or any other
standardized code (from code books) or piece of
text.
Once a crib was located
(special techniques existed to do this) the
associations between the letters of the
ciphertext and their plain version were entered
in the Bombe. The Bombe, which contains a large
number of drums, each replicating the rotors of
the Enigma, ran through all possible settings to
find the key settings that belong to the given
pieces of cipher and plain text. Once these
settings were found all messages, encrypted with
these setting, could be deciphered.
All information retrieved by
cryptanalysis, the breaking of codes, had the
codename “Ultra” and played a very
important and often decisive role during the war,
mainly in the Battle of the Atlantic. All Ultra
information was used very carefully, so as to
avoid suspicion among the German forces. Special
liaison officers, trained to deal with this
valuable but delicate knowledge, were placed in
Headquarters and other strategic places.
Moreover, Ultra was never used unless it could be
confirmed by a second source in order to avoid
giving the German Command reason to suspect that
their communications security might be broken.
The Kriegsmarine 
The German Kriegsmarine was
very successful in applying their Rudeltaktik or
"Wolfpack Tactics" with U-boats. They
hunted individually for convoys. If a convoy was
spotted, they shadowed it and called other
U-boats into battle. Once all U-boats were on the
spot, they sank the convoy with a closely
co-ordinated attack. This technique was so
devastating to the allied supplies that it almost
decided the outcome of the war. Communication was
the keyword and the U-boats used Enigma to send
messages to co-ordinate their attacks. After some
initial hard times, Bletchley Park broke the
naval codes almost continuously.
Decreasing effectiveness of his
U-boats made Admiral Donitz suspicious and,
although reassured by German intelligence that
Enigma was secure, he insisted on improving the
Enigma's security. Early in 1942 the famous
4-wheel machine was introduced in the Kriegmarine
and the complicated 'Shark' codes caused a big
crisis at Bletchley Park. The Kriegmarine
referred to the spring of 1942 as the "Happy
Times" because the Allied forces were unable
to decipher the codes and the U-boats were able
to continue sinking ships without much
interference. More information is found on Enigma and
the U-boat War.
Turning the tide 
The codebreakers in Blechtley
Park discovered by cryptanalysis that a fourth
rotor had entered the battlefield of codes. After
ten nerve-wracking months of heavy losses,
Bletchley Park succeeded in breaking the 'Shark'
codes. The major reason for this success was the
capture of Kurzsignal codebooks by British Navy
on German weather ships and the attacks on
U-boats like Kapitanleutenant Heidtmann’s
U-559 by HMS Petard. These boarding were not to
steal Enigma machines or key sheets, as often
wrongly portrayed in movies and books (they
already had replicas of the Enigma from the Biuro
Szyfrow). Enigma key sheets only gave access to a
particular radio net and area for a single month.
However, only two editions of
the Kurzsignal codebook, issued to all U-boats,
were ever printed during the war. These codebooks
encoded weather and operational reports in
four-letter codes, prior to encryption with
Enigma. By seizing them, Bletchley Park could use
these four-letter codes as new cribs to attack
all future Enigma setting. Moreover, new Bombes
were developed to deal with the four-rotor
Enigma, and by the end of 1943, another fifty of
these Bombes became operational in the US Navy.
More on the codebooks can be found on the enigma
procedures and Kurzsignalen pages.
The tide of the U-boat war had
turned. Except for some brief periods, the entire
communication system was intercepted by a large
number of listening stations, and the message
were broken in Bletchley Park, which employed
over 7000 workers at its peak. With the positions
of the U-boats unveiled, Allied ships could now
evade the U-boats and the Allies actively hunted
for U-boats. The elite weapon of the Kriegsmarine
got decimated, with heavy losses among the U-boat
crews. An estimated 700 U-boats and 30,000
crewmen were lost at sea. U-boat command never
suspected cryptanalysis of the Enigma and related
these losses to new Allied submarine detection
techniques like ASDIC sonar, surface radar, HF
direction finding and anti-submarine airplanes.
All improvements, introduced by
the German Forces, were tackled successfully by
the codebreakers. The introduction of the
rewireable D reflector, with its key changes
every ten days, proved to be a big problem to the
codebreakers. A widespread use of the D reflector
would require five to ten days to break a
particular key, which would render tactical
information useless. Without the D reflector,
keys were broken mostly within 24 hours.
Fortunately, logistical problems prevented
general use of the D reflector in the German
forces. Also, German operators were reluctant to
use the D reflector and found it too elaborate to
program in tactical situations. Instead, the B
reflector remained the default reflector and the
D reflector was used only for important messages,
on the same machines with the same basic machine
settings for rotors and plugboard. However, with
the key already broken for these machines with
the B reflector, the codebreaker only had to
retrieve the unknown wiring of the D reflector,
used on the same machines. A work that was
performed by hand.
The fatal mixed use of B and D
reflectors enabled the codebreakers to continue
reading the once feared D reflector messages. The
Enigma Uhr (clock), used by the Luftwaffe, was
another useless effort by the Germans to increase
the security of the Enigma. The Uhr was a switch
that replaced the plugs of the Enigma and
provided 40 different plug wirings. However, the
unique design of the Allied Bombes, used to
retrieve the key settings of the Enigma, excluded
the plugboard wiring. The Enigma Uhr therefore
had little or no effect on the codebreaking
results. |
|
Enimga M4 thin reflector (left)
and special
Beta rotor with spring-loaded pins on
both
sides
|
Kriegsmarine M4 box to store the
five unusednormal rotors and one Beta or
Gamma rotor
|
|
Box to store the two unused
rotors of a set
of five rotors
|
|
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